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Objection to the Legitimacy of the Sheriff's Sale
Filed March 3, 2020

Objection to the Legitimacy of the Sheriff's Sale


COMES NOW, Nick and Donna Nickerson, as Defendants Pro Se per 28 U.S.C. § 1654, and object to the Sheriff’s Sale held on February 12, 2020, for the reasons listed below. Additionally we hereby incorporate our Brief in Support of Motion to Annul, Vacate and Set Aside Sale, Request for Emergency Injunction to Postpone Sale, and Reply Brief in Support of Emergency Injunction to Postpone Sale as further support of the meritorious basis for this objection.

1. The Sheriff’s Sale violated statutory notice and process requirements.

Under MCA § 71-1-224, it was required for us to be properly noticed by personal service at least 30 days before the sale. We were notified by mail on January 16, 2020, only 13 days before the sale scheduled for January 29, 2020, then verbally notified 14 days before February 12, 2020, when the sale actually occurred. This failure to follow the statutory notice process severely prejudiced our access and ability to defend against this new attack, have access to legal counsel to advise us of our rights, and have time to seek alternative ways of challenging or satisfying the unlawfully inflated judgment and interest amount.

 

MCA § 71-1-224.  Sale -- notice.
Real estate sold under a power of sale given and contained in a mortgage of real estate, except in a trust indenture as defined in the Small Tract Financing Act of Montana, shall be advertised for sale at least 30 days before the date fixed for such sale, in a newspaper in the county in which such real estate is situated, and in case there is no newspaper printed and published in said county, then by posting notices in at least five conspicuous places in said county, one of which notices must be posted on the land so advertised for sale. Two other notices must be posted in conspicuous places in the township in which said land is situated, one in such conspicuous place in said county as will be most likely to give notice to all persons interested in said sale, and one of said notices must be posted in a conspicuous place at the front door of the county courthouse of the county in which said land is located, and in addition to the publication or posting, as hereinbefore provided, notices of such sale must be served personally at least 30 days before the date fixed for such sale upon the occupant of the property so advertised for sale and upon the mortgagor if within the state of Montana and upon every person or persons having or claiming an interest of record in the real estate so advertised for sale who may be found within the state of Montana. (emphasis added)

 

According to First Nat’l Corp. v. Perrine, failure to follow the requirements of this section makes a sale void.

 

The notice of sale of mortgaged realty under a power of sale in the mortgage on default of the mortgagor is jurisdictional; unless the requirements of this section were met, a sale made is void. First Nat'l Corp. v. Perrine, 99 M 454, 43 P2d 1073 (1935).

 

Finally, according to the law and the Montana Supreme Court, this law is jurisdictional and not procedural, and therefore, our objection is meritorious and should be sustained. Further, the sale is void and we move the Court to vacate it.

 

2. The Sheriff’s Sale violated statutory code by selling more than sufficient property, and by selling all three parcels of our property at a price so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience.

The alleged note in this action is for REDACTED. The original loan was secured based on the land value only as our home was unfinished at the time and was not allowed to be included in value computations. The judgment amount granted without authority, in error, and in violation of statutory interest rates on February 19, 2016 was for REDACTED. This means the judgment amount, by the Plaintiff’s delay, has accrued to over REDACTED by February 12, 2020.

HSBC’s alleged bidding agent credit bid REDACTED for PARCEL II Lot A. This is a 35-acre timbered parcel with over a quarter mile of MT Highway 200 road frontage, water, and spectacular views. This price is barely over REDACTED an acre when a local investor previously affirmed the value of this parcel alone sufficient to satisfy the judgment amount.

HSBC’s alleged bidding agent credit bid REDACTED for PARCEL I. This unique 167 acre timbered parcel with over a half a mile of MT Highway 200 road frontage, water, rock outcroppings, unsurpassed views, primarily buildable land, and other improvements, has unlimited development potential and is a highly sought after and rare piece of land. This price of less than REDACTED an acre redefines highway robbery for prime real estate located in a highly desired location. Fair market value of this parcel exceeds any debts owed and secures earned wealth in our family portfolio.

HSBC’s alleged bidding agent credit bid REDACTED for PARCEL II Lot B. This parcel is 21 fenced and cross-fenced acres and contains our finished log home, whose value was not included in the original loan. Land sales and real estate offerings readily available for public review confirm the value of our custom built, three level Swedish cope log home alone exceeds the loan amount. Further, substantial improvements, development on, and uses of this parcel escalate its market value well beyond any owed debts.

HSBC credit bid an aggregate total of REDACTED for all three parcels at the sale against our objections, and in violation of the Court’s order granting HSBC the right to “bid its judgment.”

HSBC credit bid a grossly inadequate sale price in violation of court order and for less than one fourth of its judgment amount, and for a third of the value of our home alone. Case law, justice, and humane treatment of fellow Montanans require this sale be set aside due to the grossly inadequate sale price and unfair severity of consequence.

 

“Where a grossly inadequate price is bid, such as shocks one's conscience, an equity court may set aside the sale, thus insuring within limited bounds a modicum of protection to a party who has absolutely no control over the amount bid and this, in effect, insures that the foreclosed property is not `given away.'”
Nussbaumer v. SUPERIOR COURT IN & FOR CTY. OF YUMA, 489 P.2d 843, 107 Ariz. 504 (1971).


"A court may order an execution sale set aside on the basis of two grounds: First, the purchase price received at the sheriff's sale may be so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court and justify setting aside the sale, (Citing authority). Second, where there is an inadequacy of price which in itself might not be grounds for setting aside the sale, slight additional circumstances or matters of equity may so justify... ."
Peterson v. Montana Bank of Bozeman, NA, 687 P.2d 673, 212 Mont. 37 (1984)

 

Further, this sale violated MCA § 25-13-704 as the value of any one of our parcels more than satisfies the original loan amount. The Plaintiff is receiving unjust gain and stealing our significant and substantial equity in our property by the ridiculously grotesque sales price credit bid for all three parcels at the Sheriff’s Sale.

 

MCA § 25-13-704.  Conduct of sale.

(1) All sales of property under execution must be made at auction to the highest bidder, between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution, no more property may be sold. The officer holding the execution or the officer's deputy may not become a purchaser or be interested in any purchase at the sale.

(emphasis added)

 

We object to the legitimacy of the sale due to the grotesquely inadequate sales price and the unjust and unfair gain secured by the Plaintiff. Our objection should be sustained and we move the Court to set aside the sale so a fair and just remedy may be found.

 

3. HSBC violated the Court’s order by credit bidding less than the judgment amount.
The Plaintiff requested in their Complaint the following:

 

“that the Foreclosure Sale be for cash, except that HSBC Bank USA. . . be allowed to credit bid up to all sums owed to it under the foreclosure decree;”

The Court’s Order on Motion for Entry of Final Judgment stated the following:

“It is further ordered that if Plaintiff becomes the purchaser at said sale, that Plaintiff may bid its judgment as opposed to cash.”

 

HSBC violated the Court’s order by credit bidding less than one fourth of the judgment amount as an aggregate total for all three parcels. Granting a judgment which allowed for a credit bid less than the judgment amount would have been an appealable issue, and HSBC’s violation of court order prejudices us by granting HSBC unjust, unlawful and unfair gain. Because the Sheriff’s sale was not in accordance with the Court’s order, this sale was illegitimate and must be set aside. Such an injustice being endorsed empowers creditors to become predators and causes them to willfully, intentionally, and maliciously create such sales to harm, injure, and damage innocent debtors. Further, this grossly inadequate price violates the intent of MCA § 71-1-222(1)(a), and MCA § 25-13-704(1) and allows any creditor to seize all of a debtor’s property and receive an extortioner windfall. Sales, listings, and investor opinions validates the value of one parcel or our Swedish cope log home alone, without the 224 acres and all improvements, exceeds the original loan amount.

 

MCA § 71-1-222.  Proceedings in foreclosure suits.

(1) There is only one action for the recovery of debt or the enforcement of any right secured by a mortgage upon real estate, and that action must be in accordance with the provisions of this part. In the action, the court may, by its judgment, direct:

(a)  a sale of the encumbered property or as much of the property as may be necessary; (emphasis added)

 

MCA § 25-13-704.  Conduct of sale.

(1) All sales of property under execution must be made at auction to the highest bidder, between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution, no more property may be sold. (emphasis added)

 

Since the Plaintiff violated the Court’s order and has secured unjust gain, advantage, and more than sufficient property, our objection to this illegitimate sale should be sustained, and we move the Court to set aside the sale.

 

4. Opposing counsels have practiced deceit regarding who the real party in interest is.

Kenneth Lay in his appearance filed on February 4, 2020, presented Wells Fargo is the real party in interest/plaintiff in this matter (see Affidavit of Nick Nickerson in Support of Motions Exhibit B, and Brief in Support of Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Summary Judgment Order). The Lewis and Clark County Sheriff’s Office provided us a letter of instruction from Hillary R. McCormack dated July 26, 2019, that states it is regarding “Wells Fargo v. Nickerson,” and provides the same civil case number as this action (see Affidavit of Nick Nickerson in Support of Motions Exhibit C, and Brief in Support of Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Summary Judgment Order). HSBC and Wells Fargo have blocked all regulatory and contractual oversight assistance and support by denying involvement and making contradictory claims. Erika Peterman admitted during oral argument at the summary judgment hearing if Wells Fargo was a party to this suit our claims would create a factual dispute and preclude the granting of summary judgment (see Brief in Support of Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Summary Judgment Order). The deceit of opposing counsels regarding who the real party in interest/plaintiff is in this matter is a substantial issue that should require reversal of the sale and entire foreclosure action. Despite our repeated and insistent requests for proof of authority and requests the Court require it be produced, we have continued to suffer severe, significant, and substantial damages due to the fraudulent concealment of the truths of this matter (see Affidavit of Nick Nickerson in Support of Motions Exhibit E, and Brief in Support of Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Summary Judgment Order). Now disclosing Wells Fargo as a party cannot be construed as a simple clerical error or misunderstanding without granting us opportunity for further discovery. Either HSBC or Wells Fargo had to contact each of these attorneys and hire them to appear on their behalf. This attorney/client process would include communication, payment receipts, written instructions, and telephone conversations with their client. Attorneys are touted as being “professionals” and skilled presenters and orators. It is a clearly erroneous and illogical argument they would forget who their client is and frequently misname them, unless the true Plaintiff in this matter is in fact Wells Fargo and they forgot to say HSBC in written documents. Opposing counsels are insulting the intelligence and integrity of the Court by this 8-yearlong refusal to produce proof of authority under MCA § 37-61-402. We have suffered extreme prejudice and been unable to find advocacy in the law due to the cowardice and fear of reprisal imposed by Wells Fargo in Montana. Our integrity, sense of patriotism to protect and preserve Constitutional and contractual rights of relief and redress, commitment to do the right thing and stand for freedom and justice for all, and unwillingness to submit to banking despotism and mortgage terrorism, has caused us to be victimized, abused, and severely injured. The deceit and fraudulent concealment practiced by opposing counsels regarding who the real party in interest/plaintiff is in this matter, and procedurally quashing our attempts to secure discovery, has severely prejudiced the outcome of this case, and has injured us by the years of malicious litigation, forced defense of our rights, and the sale of our multimillion dollar property at a fraction of the replacement value of the home alone with no recap of our substantial equity or the over half million dollars we have paid toward our property ownership. It would have taken years for Wells Fargo to have collected what they have already collected if they had not deceived us with the adhesive closing documents. Their ongoing deceit and concealment has prevented us from presenting our valid legal claims in this matter and denied us all pathways and access to justice. We have approached Montana Courts with truth and only asked for justice for all to also include us. This sale must be set aside under MCA § 37-61-402 until our outstanding motions can be heard to address the deceit of opposing counsels. The Court should sustain our objection, and we move the Court to acknowledge and act on our meritorious claims for relief and redress, and set aside the sale.

 

MCA § 37-61-402 Production of proof of authority to court.

The court or judge, on motion of either party, may require the attorney of the adverse party to produce and prove the authority under which the attorney appears and may stay all proceedings until the authority is shown and may at any time summarily relieve a party from the consequences of the acts of an unauthorized attorney.

 

“The court may, on motion of either party made in good faith and upon a showing supported by affidavit or otherwise, require the attorney of the adverse party to produce and prove the authority under which he appears and, if it be shown that the attorney has no such authority, dismiss the action. In re Astibia's Estate, 100 M 224, 46 P2d 712 (1935)” Missoula Belt Line Ry. Co. v. Smith, 58 Mont. 432, 193 P 529 (1920)

5. The Final Judgment the Writ of Execution references is void.

On May 26, 2015, we filed a Notice of Appeal. This Court entered its Order on Motion for Entry of Final Judgment on February 19, 2016. On April 25, 2017 the Montana Supreme Court stated the following:

 

“Since 1954 it has been an established rule in Montana that when a notice of appeal has been filed, jurisdiction over the parties to the controversy and subject matter passes from the District Court and vests in the Supreme Court. It becomes the Supreme Court’s duty to maintain the status quo of the parties until the controversy can be determined.” Julian v. Buckley, 191 Mont. 487, 490-91, 625 P.2d 526, 528 (1981) (citing Benolken v. Miracle, 128 Mont. 262, 273 P.2d 677 (1954)). See also ABC Collectors, Inc. v. Birnel, 2006 MT 148, ¶9, 332 Mont. 410, 138 P.3d 802. The Nickersons’ appeal remains pending before this Court. Once the notice of appeal was filed, “the District Court was without authority and jurisdiction to make or enter any further order except in matters embraced in the action and not affected by the order appealed from.” Julian, 191 Mont. at 491, 625 P.2d at 528. Order of Supreme Court, Filed April 25, 2017.

 

We appealed the Court’s Summary Judgment order, and per the Montana Supreme Court, this Court erred in issuing a Final Judgment during the appeal. The Plaintiff has failed to request a new Final Judgment since the Montana Supreme Court issued its final decision on August 22, 2017. Based on the Montana Supreme Court’s order filed April 25, 2017, the Court’s Final Judgment issued on February 19, 2016, was rendered in error. This sale must be set aside as illegitimate, and a new final judgment will need to be requested by the Plaintiff in order for a lawfully binding sale to occur. Our objection to this sale as being unlawful and not binding should be sustained and we move the Court to set aside the sale.

 

6. The Sheriff’s Sale was conducted under an invalid writ.

The Writ of Execution issued on November 19, 2019, is invalid, as it fails to comply with MCA § 25-13-301.

 

MCA § 25-13-301. Form and contents of writ.

 (1) The writ of execution must:

(c)  intelligibly refer to the judgment, stating the court and the county where it was entered and, if it is for money, the amount of money and the amount actually due on the judgment; and

(2)  In executions, the amount of the execution must be computed and stated as near as may be possible in dollars and cents, rejecting fractions of a cent. (emphasis added)

 

The Writ of Execution fails to compute or state the amount of the execution as near as possible necessary to satisfy the judgment as required by statute. We object to the legitimacy of a sale being held on a four year old judgment figure without the current judgment amount provided in the writ. The Court should sustain our objection and we move the Court to set aside the sale, and sanction the Plaintiff for not providing a current judgment figure in the Writ of Execution as required by law.

 

7. The Final Judgment principal balance amount has no basis in fact or law.

The principal balance claimed by the Plaintiff of REDACTED has not been substantiated by admissible, authenticated, or sworn evidence. As a matter of law and fact, there is no proof of REDACTED being a principal balance owed on the account, and the alleged note was for REDACTED. Therefore, this sale must be set aside as it is based on an amount that has never been proven. This unsubstantiated principal balance the judgment is based upon severely prejudices our ability to satisfy a judgment and provides unjust gain to HSBC. Further, if the judgment was based on the alleged note principal balance and the judgment interest rate was correctly calculated per MCA § 25-9-205(2), the current judgment amount would be reduced by over REDACTED. This drastically inflated judgment amount severely prejudices any opportunity to satisfy the unlawful judgment. In addition, after paying over a half million dollars toward our property ownership and toward satisfying any loan on it, it is unconscionable to secure judgment for even the original loan amount, but outrageously unjust to allow a judgment amount of almost twice the alleged note. We object to the legitimacy of a sale based on an unsubstantiated judgment amount and our objection should be sustained. We move the Court to acknowledge the judgment amount is not just or fair and set aside this sale.

 

8. The Final Judgment interest rate is in violation of Montana statute and the alleged contract.

This Court granted HSBC a post-judgment interest rate of 10%. This is in violation MCA § 25-9-205(2).     

 

MCA § 25-9-205.  Amount of interest.

(2)  Interest on a judgment recovered in the courts of this state involving a contractual obligation that specifies an interest rate must be paid at the rate specified in the contractual obligation.

 

The alleged note states:

“Interest will be charged on unpaid principal until the full amount of Principal has been paid. I will pay interest at a yearly rate of 6.250%. The interest rate required by this Section 2 is the rate I will pay both before and after my default described in Section 6(B) of this Note.” (emphasis added)

The statutorily incorrect interest rate granted by the Court severely prejudiced our ability to satisfy the unlawful judgment and continues to harm and injure us as this statutorily incorrect judgment interest rate is accruing on our redemption price per MCA 25-13-802. It was our intention to properly and timely address this issue when a new final judgment was requested by the Plaintiff. We object to this illegitimate sale based on a wrongfully calculated interest amount and our objection should be sustained. We move the Court to set aside the sale to conform the judgment or since justice so requires grant us leave to amend our Answer, Counterclaim, Third Party Complaint, and demand for Jury Trial, and grant us access to justice.

 

9. Our Warranty Deed is superior in right, prior in time, and paramount title to any lien allegedly held by HSBC.
The deceit and fraud practiced by opposing counsels regarding who the real party in interest/plaintiff is, and the myriad of illegalities surrounding the void assignments HSBC’s alleged counsels have used to claim HSBC’s alleged ownership, require this sale to be set aside. We are the Holders of the only lawful and valid legal title to our property, and this Court has a duty to allow us to defend our property against unlawful claims. We object to this sale that deprives us of our lawful property ownership by an entity that has practiced deceit and fraud to steal our rights. We object to the legitimacy of these proceedings and our objection should be sustained. We move the Court to set this sale aside and allow our meritorious motions that have been filed to be heard.

 

10. HSBC’s claims of standing and ownership are based on alleged assignments of record that are void.

We have challenged the assignments of record HSBC has relied upon to claim ownership as being illegal, fraudulent, forged, and void. HSBC has not denied or re-butted these assertions. Controlling case law clearly establishes we have a right to challenge the assignments of record.

Further, in addition to case law, common sense and protection of the homeowner overwhelmingly demonstrate our claims regarding these void assignments are valid and we deserve the right to challenge HSBC’s thus far successful “get out of jail free” card.

 

“Accordingly, we conclude that a homeowner who has been foreclosed on by one with no right to do so — by those facts alone — sustains prejudice or harm sufficient to constitute a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure. When a non-debtholder forecloses, a homeowner is harmed by losing her home to an entity with no legal right to take it. Therefore, under those circumstances, the void assignment is the proximate cause of actual injury and all that is required to be alleged to satisfy the element of prejudice or harm in a wrongful foreclosure cause of action. The opposite rule, urged by defendants in this case, would allow an entity to foreclose with impunity on homes that were worth less than the amount of the debt, even if there were no legal justification whatsoever for the foreclosure. The potential consequences of wrongfully evicting homeowners are too severe to allow such a result. (See Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 410 [186 Cal.Rptr.3d 625] (Miles).)

“On the issue of standing, the Supreme Court stated, "`[B]anks are neither private attorneys general nor bounty hunters, armed with a roving commission to seek out defaulting homeowners and take away their homes in satisfaction of some other bank's deed of trust.'" (Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 938.) Yvanova's holding on standing would be undermined unless the same considerations applied in determining what prejudice must be alleged to constitute a wrongful foreclosure cause of action. (Ibid.) Therefore, we reverse the judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court erroneously sustained a demurrer to Sciarratta's first amended complaint without leave to amend, and remand for further proceedings.

”[O]nly the entity currently entitled to enforce a debt may foreclose on the mortgage or deed of trust securing that debt...." (Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 928.) "It is no mere `procedural nicety,' from a contractual point of view, to insist that only those with authority to foreclose on a borrower be permitted to do so." (Id. at p. 938.)

A homeowner experiences prejudice or harm when an entity with no interest in the debt forecloses. When a non-debtholder forecloses, a homeowner is harmed because he or she has lost her home to an entity with no legal right to take it. If not for the void assignment, the incorrect entity would not have pursued a wrongful foreclosure. Therefore, the void assignment is the cause in fact of the homeowner's injury and all he or she is required to allege on the element of prejudice. The critical issue is not the plaintiff's ability to pay, but rather whether the defendant's conduct resulted in the plaintiff's harm; i.e., a foreclosure that was wrongful because it was initiated by a person or entity having no legal right to do so; i.e. holding void title. As the Supreme Court stated in Yvanova, ‘the bank or other entity that ordered the foreclosure would not have done so absent the allegedly void assignment. Thus `[t]he identified harm — the foreclosure — can be traced directly to [the foreclosing entity's] exercise of the authority purportedly delegated by the assignment’. (Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 937.)

There are also strong policy reasons favoring this approach. A contrary rule would lead to a legally untenable situation — i.e., that anyone can foreclose on a homeowner because someone has the right to foreclose…(citation omitted) Moreover, giving homeowners - - who have the most at stake and the most to lose – the ability to challenge improper loan assignments as being absolutely void will provide a proper incentive to lending institutions to employ due diligence to properly document assignments and confirm who currently holds a loan. ‘The consequences of wrongfully evicting someone from their home are too severe to be left unchecked.’” (Ibid.)

“(Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 929, fn. 4 ["Tender has been excused when ... the plaintiff alleges the foreclosure deed is facially void, as arguably is the case when the entity that initiated the sale lacked authority to do so."].)” Sciarratta v. US Bank National Assn., 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 219, 247 Cal. App. 4th 552 (Cal: Court of Appeal, 4th Appellate Dist., 1st Div. 2016)

We submit HSBC has practiced fraud and deceit on this Court in their attempts to establish standing, ownership, debt, and default. We move this Court to nullify any law of the case that has or could have been established based on HSBC’s false claims, fraudulent accusations, and criminal concealment, and grant us full and fair opportunity to secure a just judgment based on the truths previously concealed and procedurally manipulated by the Plaintiff. Our objection should be sustained, and we move the Court to set aside the sale and allow a full and fair contest based on the merits.

 

11. HSBC breached the alleged contract, prevented our performance and nullified their rights to enforce.

 

“Once a contract has been breached, its terms may not be unilaterally resumed. The breaching party cannot claim entitlement to the contract benefits, and the nonbreaching party has no duty to perform under the contract terms.”
W. Media, Inc. v. Merrick, 232 M 480, 757 P2d 1308, 45 St. Rep. 1212 (1988)

 

HSBC breached the alleged contract by preventing our performance by and through their alleged servicer Wells Fargo, failing to provide notice of default, and preventing us from presenting our defenses and claims. All eyewitness and affidavit testimony confirms Wells Fargo refused to accept payments, and no admissible evidence has been presented to rebut this testimony. No person with personal knowledge has verified or produced any evidence of default. No person with personal knowledge can produce such evidence because we made our payments, did not default, and exerted EXTREME EFFORTS to overcome Wells Fargo’s malicious, premeditated prevention of performance. We object to these entire proceedings as a collusive racketeering scam by the Plaintiff and opposing counsels to steal our hard-earned life savings, equity, investments, home, ranch, and over REDACTED in cash money tendered as an unjust and unlawful windfall. This is extremely offensive and an affront to our rights especially when our accusers will not even crawl out of the shadows, identify themselves, and permit Constitutional, statutory, and contractual redress opportunity. We move the Court to set aside this sale, require opposing counsels to cease and desist from fraudulently concealing and manipulating truth and evidence, allow us equal and fair opportunity to present our evidence of prevention of performance as previously determined to be just, and recognize fraud, deceit, and breach of contract have waived their rights to enforce any alleged contract.

 

CONCLUSION

Therefore, because the Sheriff’s Sale violated statutory notice requirements and processes, the sale prices were grossly inadequate and so low as to shock the conscience, more than sufficient property was sold despite our objections, HSBC violated the Court’s order by bidding less than its judgment amount, opposing counsels have practiced deceit, the writ of execution is based on a void Final Judgment, the writ of execution was invalid as it failed to compute and state the actual amount due on the judgment, the principal balance amount of the judgment has no basis in fact or law, the judgment interest amount is in violation of statute, our warranty deed is superior in right and prior in time to any lien on our property, and HSBC breached the alleged contract by preventing our performance, among other issues, we object to the legitimacy of the Sheriff’s Sale. Due to the severe injuries we have and will suffer by permitting this sale to stand, irregularities and extraordinary circumstances, and grossly inadequate sale price, we object to the sale as an unlawful occurrence and move the Court to revoke, vacate, annul, and set aside the sale.

 

"A court may order an execution sale set aside on the basis of two grounds: First, the purchase price received at the sheriff's sale may be so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court and justify setting aside the sale, (Citing authority). Second, where there is an inadequacy of price which in itself might not be grounds for setting aside the sale, slight additional circumstances or matters of equity may so justify... ."
Peterson v. Montana Bank of Bozeman, NA, 687 P.2d 673, 212 Mont. 37 (1984)

 

Oral argument requested.          




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