A Letter From Nick Nickerson As A Friend of Law and Justice

August 26, 2020

Judge David Judd
Clearwater County Courthouse
150 Michigan Avenue
Orofino, Idaho 83544

Re: Case No. CR18-19-861, State of Idaho vs Jeannie K. Smith

 

Dear Judge Judd,

This letter is a good faith effort to help alleviate damages or injuries being caused to Jeannie K. Smith by Clearwater County and the State of Idaho. In compliance with previous instructions received by the Court, a copy of this letter is also provided to Clearwater County Prosecutor E. Clayne Tyler. Any responses to this letter can be mailed to my attention at 3165/139 Neff Road, Orofino, Idaho, 83544.
In Jeannie K. Smith’s Motion to Continue dated July 29, 2020, she requested the Court allow me, Nick Nickerson, to speak on her behalf regarding grave miscarriages of justice that occurred on November 12, 2019, at 3165/139 Neff Road, Orofino, ID 83544. Jeannie made this request of the Court in accordance with I.C. § 3-104 knowing that I am not an attorney and that I have never had nor ever expect to have any desire to be an attorney or to practice law. However, she knows that I have her best interest at heart and knows that over the past 12 years I have been forced to study United States and Idaho law in order to defend myself and my family against unlawful and fraudulent actions. One thing I have learned is that there are certain legal principles (often referred to as Maxims) that should govern the actions of all parties, including the Court. One of these maxims which cries out against how the State of Idaho, the Clearwater County Sheriff, and the Clearwater County Prosecutor’s Office have abused Jeannie Smith in this matter states:

He who offends against the law vainly seeks the help of the law.
Therefore, according to I.C.R. Rule 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, I am writing this letter to ask this Court to dismiss the erroneous charges brought against Jeannie and/or disqualify the Clearwater County Prosecutor’s Office from continuing their prosecution of her for the reasons listed below. Other issues exist that are not being addressed herein.

1. The state violated Idaho Criminal Rule 5(b) by failing to bring Jeannie K. Smith before a magistrate within 24 hours.
Despite the clear wording of Idaho Criminal Rule 5, stating that, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, a defendant is to be taken before a magistrate within 24 hours following the arrest, it was 13 days before Jeannie was brought before the magistrate. Her arrest was on a Tuesday and there were no intervening holidays, Saturdays or Sundays in the 24 hour period following her arrest. When she was released from custody, late on the night of November 12, 2019, she was given a Notice to Appear on November 25, 2019, (See Exhibit A.) and did not appear before a magistrate or any court official until that day. However, on November 25, 2019, when we asked for, and received, a copy of the court minutes for her hearing, the court back-dated them to November 13, 2019, to feign adherence to the rules. (See Exhibit B.) Jeannie’s arraignment did not take place on November 13, 2019. (See Exhibit C.)

 

Idaho Criminal Rule 5. Initial Appearance Before Magistrate; Determination of Probable Cause; Advice to Defendant; Plea in Misdemeanors; Initial Appearance on Grand Jury Indictment

(a)  Initial Appearance. The "initial appearance" before a magistrate is the first appearance of the defendant before any magistrate. In the event a defendant appears before more than one magistrate, the first appearance before the first magistrate constitutes the "initial appearance."

(b)  Place of Initial Appearance. A defendant arrested, whether or not pursuant to a warrant, must be taken before a magistrate in the judicial district of the arrest without unreasonable delay. In no event may the delay be more than 24 hours following the arrest, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. (emphasis added)

2. Jeannie Smith had an established right to be on the property on November 12, 2019, by the express and implied permission of those she believed to be the property owners.

According to I.C. § 18-7008(6)(a)(i) there are circumstances where entering or remaining on another person’s real property is not considered trespassing.

 

I.C. § 18-7008. Criminal Trespass -- Definitions and Acts Constituting.
(6) A person shall not be guilty of trespass under this section for entering or remaining upon real property if the person entered or remained on the property pursuant to any of the following rights or authorities:

(a) An established right of entry or occupancy of the real property in question, including, but not limited to:

(i) An invitation, whether express or implied, to enter or remain on real property…
(emphasis added)

 

A. Jeannie Smith had the express and implied permission of my wife and I.
For over 17 years Jeannie has had open access to our family ranch at 3165/139 Neff Road, Orofino, ID. She has stored many of her personal possessions there and has spent considerable time there from time to time. As of November 12, 2019, I, nor my wife, had retracted that permission or asked her to leave.
The civil ejectment case regarding our property was (and still is) in appeal as of November 12, 2019. Since one of the essential elements of an action for ejectment is proof of ownership, and this action is in appeal, we have never relinquished possession or our claims of rightful and lawful possession. Thus, ownership is contested and current possession is disputed at best. Among other issues, the factual reality my wife and I are the ones who were paying the utilities at the property on November 12, 2019, and continuing to this day, supports our lawful standing as the true and current possessors. On November 12, 2019, Jeannie believed, and in fact had, the rightful and lawful owner’s permission to be on the property commonly known as 3165/139 Neff Road, Orofino, ID . It is irrefutable she had no reason, viable or otherwise, to think she was trespassing on another person’s land.

B. By and through Sheriff Chris Goetz, Jeannie had the express and implied permission of PHH.
Even if this Court should feel or determine PHH was the rightful owner on November 12, 2019, it must still be noted Jeannie had an established (over 17 years) right of entry/“occupancy” to the property via the permission of my wife and I. To her knowledge, as of November 12, 2019, this ownership issue was in appeal and no efforts to change the status quo were in effect. Furthermore, as far as she knew, could know, or had reason to know, she had the express and implied permission of PHH, by and through Sheriff Chris Goetz to be on the property until we were notified otherwise. This was our understanding as well.
On September 3, 2019, Sheriff Chris Goetz called, and while on speaker phone, told us that the bank told him to void their check, cancel any initiated eviction efforts, and not take any further action. He stated, “so right now there is, I have no letter of instruction, no money to do anything.” He further stated that he was “angry” the bank was “jerking” him around, that he had spoken with Clayne Tyler about the bank canceling the eviction, and Clayne Tyler indicated something must have been wrong with their paperwork.  Sheriff Chris Goetz clearly stated and gave his word he would communicate with us if anything changed and reiterated we were fine to remain on the ranch. He even presented he would watch our place while our family returned home to Montana for a revival. Further, he provided professional and personal assurances if anything changed and the bank took any other actions, he would let us know. He stated it would be several weeks from the time he communicated with us about the bank initiating any eviction efforts before anything would or could happen. We never heard anything different from the sheriff prior to November 12, 2019.
On November 12, 2019, as far as Jeannie knew, could know, or had reason to know, she had the implied and express permission of even PHH to be on the property. She understood, as did we, PHH had ceased any eviction/ejectment actions, the issue was in appeal, and Sheriff Chris Goetz had clearly communicated he would inform us of any attempts or desires to change the status quo. In effect, the bank had put a voluntary stay on all proceedings and the Sheriff of Clearwater County gave his word he would let us know if anything changed.           

Therefore, because, to the best of Jeannie’s knowledge, she had the express and implied permission of any actual or possible owners of 3165/139 Neff Road, Orofino, ID on November 12, 2019, according to I.C. § 18-7008(2)(a) and I.C. § 18-201, she did not commit and was not capable of committing the crimes brought against her.

 

I.C. § 18-7008. Criminal Trespass -- Definitions and Acts Constituting.
(2) Acts constituting criminal trespass.

(a) A person commits criminal trespass and is guilty of a misdemeanor, except as provided in subsection (3)(a)(i) of this section, when he enters or remains on the real property of another without permission, knowing or with reason to know that his presence is not permitted. (emphasis added)

I.C. § 18-201. Persons Capable of Committing Crimes.

All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes:

1. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, under an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent.

2. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof.

3. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was not evil design, intention or culpable negligence.

I.C. § 18-114. Union of Act and Intent.

In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence.

3. Jeannie Smith was never legally told to leave by the owner or its agent.
On November 12, 2019, the bank nor the bank’s attorney asked or told Jeannie to leave the property and no evidence or other information has been presented to demonstrate the bank pressed or requested charges to be pressed against Jeannie. As I understand it, a Writ of Ejectment is a document that could allow the Clearwater County Sheriff’s Office to temporarily act as the alleged owner’s agent by order of the Court. The sheriff is not automatically an agent of the bank. This would be unconstitutional (Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article IX, Section 8). Only by serving and/or executing a writ does a Sheriff have the authority to assist any bank or private party. Jeannie was never shown or served with any writ. She was never shown or served any document authorizing the deputies and/or state patrol to remove her from the property that as far as she knew, could know, or had reason to know, she had a legal right and express and implied permission to be on. I trust the Court, if faced with a similar situation, would not relinquish possession of something they had an established right to, simply because someone demanded it without producing any legal authority to do so.

4. The state had no authority to break and enter private dwellings to arrest Jeannie Smith.

The Writ of Ejectment that the Clearwater County Sheriff’s Office was supposedly acting on was specifically stamped ‘SERVE AND LEAVE’. The sheriff’s office did not serve, or serve and leave. Additionally, the writ instructed the sheriff to give the Defendants some time to take their possessions and leave after service of the writ.

 

“…you are hereby commanded to cause Defendants and their goods and chattels to be forthwith removed from the premises and the Plaintiff is to have restitution of the same. In the event the goods and chattels are not promptly removed thereafter by the said Defendants, you are authorized and empowered to cause the same to be removed to be a safe place for storage.” Second Writ of Ejectment

Jeannie was never served a writ nor given any opportunity to remove her personal belongings and leave prior to the deputies and state police trespassing, cutting down a locked gate, breaking windows, axing down doors, arresting Jeannie, destroying property and hauling away five moving trucks of our, and her, personal belongings. Furthermore, the state did not possess a warrant for Jeannie’s arrest and there were no exigent circumstances.

 

Idaho Sheriffs Civil Manual
1.1.1 Background.

Process. In Idaho law, process is the pieces of paper wherein the court exercises its authority. Process includes writs, warrants, summons, and orders of courts. Idaho Code § 31-2201. (emphasis added)

 

Idaho Sheriffs Civil Manual
1.3.9 Entry to Land, Buildings, and Dwellings.

A sheriff may peaceably enter private buildings and dwellings to effect execution of process, but may not break and enter against the owner's wishes, except where specifically authorized by the court to do so. (emphasis added)

“As the United States Supreme Court stated in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1381-82, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 653 (1980) (citation omitted):

The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home — a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: `The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated.' That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that `[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.' In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”
State v. Maland, 103 P.3d 430, 140 Idaho 817 (2004).

Exigent-Circumstances Doctrine
The rule that emergency conditions may justify a warrantless search and seizure, esp. when there is probable cause to believe that evidence will be removed or destroyed before a warrant can be obtained.  Black’s Law Dictionary, 10^th Edition

I have read the alleged writ and find no specific authorization for the deputies and state police to break and enter prior to even serving the writ. There was no criminal activity involved, warrants, probable cause, exigent circumstances or any other justifying reason for breaking, entering, destroying the peace, security, and tranquility of our property, and arresting Jeannie.

 

5. The state violated Jeannie Smith’s constitutional rights.
According to the Constitution, Jeannie has the right to be secure in her person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures that shall not be violated. On November 12, 2019, her rights were violated. Without any warrant, without serving any writ, without probable cause, and without any other justifying reason, Jeannie’s person, papers, effects and the house she was staying in was searched and seized. This was unconstitutional.

 

Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Prohibited
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article I, Section 17

Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States

Unlawful search
Within constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, an examination or inspection without authority of law of premises or person with view to discovery of stolen, contraband, or illicit property, or for some evidence of guilt to be used in prosecution of criminal action. Const.U.S. Amend. 4. Bush v. State, 64 Okl.Cr. 161, 77 P.2d 1184, 1187.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition

Furthermore, the state had no probable cause that would give them a lawful exception to seize and search Jeannie or her possessions without a warrant. As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated:

“This Court has always used the language of "probable cause" in determining the constitutionality of an arrest without a warrant. See, e. g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 156, 161-162; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-15; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 455-456; Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 479-484. To give power to the police to seize a person on some grounds different from or less than "probable cause" would be handing them more authority than could be exercised by a magistrate in issuing a warrant to seize a person. As we stated in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, with respect to requirements for arrests without warrants: "Whether or not the requirements of reliability and particularity of the information on which an officer may act are more stringent where an arrest warrant is absent, they surely cannot be less stringent than where an arrest warrant is obtained." Id., at 479. And we said in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176:

"These long-prevailing standards [for probable cause] seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)

Probable Cause.

Reasonable cause. State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545, 198 N.W. 282, 284. Having more evidence for than against. Ex parte Souza, 65 Cal.App. 9, 222 P. 869, 870. A reasonable ground for belief in the existence of 'facts warranting the proceedings complained of. Owens v. Graetzel, 149 Md. 689, 132 A. 265, 267. An apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry, (that is, such inquiry as the given case renders convenient and proper,) which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe, in a criminal case, that the accused person had committed the crime charged…   Black’s Law Dictionary, 4^th Edition (emphasis added)

The finding of probable cause must be based on substantial evidence that there is a factual basis for the information furnished. I.C.R. 5

No reasonable or prudent man would determine there was any cause for sudden search and seizure when the Clearwater County Sheriff knew he had told our family he saw the fraud and illegal actions of the bank, expressed that he was trying to help us stand against the illegal actions of the bank, told us the bank had stopped the eviction, clearly stated he would communicate if anything changed, never communicated anything had changed prior to November 12, 2019, and never served the alleged writ. Furthermore, from what I experienced on November 12, 2019, and have learned since, this was a well-planned and well-laid out scheme that involved multiple county and state agencies, extended surveillance, multiple staging areas, snipers in place surrounding the entire extended area since the wee hours that morning, an illegal road block, numerous officers in tactical gear, and other planned activities. There was plenty of time during the planning to obtain all necessary paperwork should there have been any probable cause for search and seizure. However, it was not obtained because there was, and is, no cause. We have always been and continue to be upstanding, law abiding citizens.

The state violated Jeannie’s security on November 12, 2019, when they deceptively, forcefully, unreasonably, and without authority attacked 3165/139 Neff Road, Orofino, ID, when as far as she knew, could know or had reason to know, she had every right to be there. However, they not only violated her security on that day, they also violated her security for the rest of her life. When the “good guys,” i.e. law enforcement, break the law and treat law abiding citizens as criminals, how can Jeannie ever feel safe again?

6. The state did not inform Jeannie Smith of the intention to arrest her, the cause of arrest, or the authority to arrest her prior to arresting her.
After sheriff deputies and state police with assault rifles drawn broke and entered the house, they did not inform Jeannie of their intention to arrest, the cause of arrest, or their authority to arrest, prior to removing her from the house she was staying in and double handcuffing her.

 

I.C. § 19-608. Information to Person Arrested.
The person making the arrest must inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it, except when the person to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, an offense, or is pursued immediately after its commission, or after an escape.

I.C. § 19-602. Arrest, How Made.
An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person of the defendant, or by his submission to the custody of an officer. The defendant must not be subjected to any more restraint than is necessary for his arrest and detention. (emphasis added)

“Here, the officers had no warrant, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Sprague, did not advise him of the fact that he was under arrest. The officers urge that the same limits for use of force should apply to non-warrant situations where probable cause for an arrest exists. We agree with this assertion; however, the fact remains that Sprague insists that he was not informed of his arrest as required by I.C. § 19-610 (1982) as a prerequisite to the use of any force. The district court erroneously accepted the officers' view that the issue of whether or not they had informed Sprague of the fact of his arrest is irrelevant in light of the provisions of I.C. § 19-608 (1982) which states:

Information to person arrested. — The person making the arrest must inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it, except when the person to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, an offense, or is pursued immediately after its commission, or after an escape.

The officers contend that since Sprague was in the actual physical control of a motor vehicle at a time when they had reason to believe that he was driving under the influence of intoxicating beverages, he was in violation of I.C. § 49-1102 (1982) and, hence, was "engaged in the commission" of an offense. Therefore, the officers insist and the district court agreed that the officers did not need to inform Sprague of the fact of his arrest at the time they arrested him.

We cannot agree with the trial court's very narrow, hypertechnical reading of the statute. The clear intent of the statute was to uphold an otherwise lawful arrest when, under the circumstances, it would not be practical for an officer to inform the arrestee of the fact of the arrest, the officer's authority to make the arrest, and the cause for the arrest (i.e. when a suspect flees). Here, the officers had stopped Sprague. There was no showing that he attempted to avoid them or failed to stop when they signaled him to do so…Simply stated, there was no reason for them not to advise him of the fact of his arrest, the reason therefore, and their authority to make the arrest.” Sprague v. City of Burley, 710 P.2d 566, 109 Idaho 656 (1985)

 

At no time did Jeannie resist, use force against an officer, or attempt to flee, nor has she been accused on such behavior. Yet, in violation of I.C. § 19-608, police powers of the State of Idaho, allegedly acting on behalf of a private corporation, failed to inform Jeannie of their intention to arrest her, the cause of her arrest, or their authority to arrest her, prior to arresting her without any justifying reason. According to Jeannie, no officer ever communicated what she had done wrong or how she was injuring the property or any person by being present on the property on November 12, 2019.

7. The state used excessive force in Jeannie Smith’s arrest.

Although Jeannie made no attempt to resist or flee, she was double handcuffed. This is excessive use of force and restraint and was in direct violation of I.C. § 19-602.

 

I.C. § 19-602. Arrest, How Made.
An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person of the defendant, or by his submission to the custody of an officer. The defendant must not be subjected to any more restraint than is necessary for his arrest and detention. (emphasis added)

I.C. § 19-610. What Force May Be Used.
When the arrest is being made by an officer under the authority of a warrant or when the arrest is being made without a warrant but is supported by probable cause to believe that the person has

committed an offense, after information of the intention to make the arrest, if the person to be arrested either flees or forcibly resists, the officer may use all reasonable and necessary means to effect the arrest… (emphasis added)

Excessive
Greater than what is usual or proper; overmuch; a general term for what goes beyond just measure or amount. Austin St. Ry. Co. v. Oldham, Tex.Civ.App., 109 S.W.2d 235, 237.

Tending to or marked by excess, which is the quality or state of exceeding the proper or reasonable limit or measure. Railway Co. v. Johnston, 106 Ga. 130, 32 S.E. 78; Morrow v. Missouri Gas & Electric Service Co., 315 Mo. 367, 286 S.W. 106, 111
Black’s Law Dictionary, 4^th Edition

Excessive Force
Unreasonable or unnecessary force under the circumstances.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 10^th Edition

 

8. The state subjected Jeannie Smith to inhumane and oppressive treatment.

After Jeannie’s illegal arrest, she was made to sit out in the cold, on a concrete type retaining wall, out in the rain for hours, when over 7,000 covered square feet of buildings and porches existed on the property. It is well documented and general common knowledge that prolonged exposure to cold, rainy conditions, and sitting on a cold, hard surface can endanger one’s health in a variety of ways including colds, flu, pneumonia, hemorrhoids, and other potentially painful, debilitating, and/or life-threatening illnesses which thousands die from every year. Double hand-cuffing and then purposefully placing an unarmed, non-violent, non-resisting, nearly 60-year-old woman out in the elements, on an uncomfortable hard surface for hours, when thousands of covered, heated, and comfortable square footage were available certainly cannot be called humane by any definition.

I.C. § 18-704. Inhuman Treatment of Prisoners.
Every officer who is guilty of willful inhumanity or oppression toward any prisoner under his care or in his custody is punishable by fine not exceeding $5,000, and removal from office.

Inhuman Treatment

Such barbarous cruelty or severity as endangers the life or health of the party to whom it is addressed, or creates a well-founded apprehension of such danger. Whaley v. Whaley, 68 Iowa 647, 27 N.W. 809; Cole v. Cole, 23 Iowa 433. The phrase commonly employed in statutes is "cruel and inhuman treatment," from which it may be inferred that "inhumanity" is an extreme or aggravated "cruelty."  Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition

 

Oppression

The misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury. 1 Russ. Crimes, 297; Steph.Dig.Crim.Law, 71. See U. S. v. Deaver, D.C.N.C., 14 F. 597. An act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, or excessive use of authority. Ramsbacker v. Hohman, 80 Mont. 480, 261 P. 273, 276, an act of subjecting to cruel and unjust hardship; an act of domination. Baker v. Peck, 1 Cal.App.2d 231, 36 P.2d 404, 406. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition

 

The act or an instance of unjustly exercising authority or power so that one or more people are unfairly or cruelly prevented from enjoying the same rights that other people have.

Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th Edition

 

When the handcuffs were finally taken off hours later, Jeannie could barely lift her hands above her head because of the pain, stiffness, and exposure to cold. Once again, at no time did she resist, assault or attempt to flee. She was subjected to all of this with no warrant, probable cause, or aggressive or evasive behavior.

9. The state illegally arrested and falsely imprisoned Jeannie Smith.
The police forces secretly hired by the bank who invaded our property did not act in accordance with the writ from which they allegedly gained their authority. The state had no warrant for Jeannie’s arrest. There could be no probable cause when the Clearwater County Sheriff knew he had told us the bank had stopped eviction, clearly stated he would communicate if anything changed, never communicated anything had changed prior to November 12, 2019, and never served the writ. The state had no probable cause to arrest Jeannie. On November 12, 2019, to the best of her knowledge, she was within her right to be on the property commonly known as 3165/139 Neff Road, Orofino, ID. Jeannie had the implied and express permission of all possible owners, that permission had not been revoked, and she had not been asked to leave by any owners, prior to sheriff deputies and state police forcibly, illegally and unconstitutionally breaking and entering, unlawfully and unconstitutionally arresting and detaining her with excessive force, and unconstitutionally searching, seizing, and confiscating her person, house, papers, and effects. The officers never showed or served her with a writ ordering her to leave or remove her belongings from the premises. Using excessive and unnecessary force, under the pretense of legal authority, but without actually acting according to its mandates, sheriff deputies and state police forcefully detained, falsely imprisoned, and humiliated Jeannie. As a result, she has been forced to post excessive bail and fight these false charges.

I.C. § 18-703. Illegal Arrests and Seizures.

Every public officer, or person pretending to be a public officer, who, under the pretense or color of any process or other legal authority, arrests any person or detains him against his will, or seizes or levies upon any property, or dispossesses any one of any lands or tenements, without a regular process or other lawful authority therefor, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

I.C. § 18-2901. False Imprisonment Defined.
False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.

Imprisonment
Every confinement of the person is an "imprisonment," whether it be in a common prison, or in a private house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets. Norton v. Mathers, 222 Iowa 1170, 271 N.W. 321, 324.  Black’s Law Dictionary, 4^th Edition

False imprisonment

The unlawful arrest or detention of a person without warrant, or by an illegal warrant, or a warrant illegally executed, and either in a prison or a place used temporarily for that purpose, or by force and constraint without confinement. Eberling v. State, 136 Ind. 117, 35 N.E. 1023. False imprisonment consists in the unlawful detention of the person of another, for any length of time, whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty. Mahan v. Adam, 144 Md. 355, 124 A. 901, 904.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 4^th Edition

“‘No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.’ Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1891).”  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excess fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.  Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article I, Section 6

Excessive Bail
Bail in a sum more than will be reasonably sufficient to prevent evasion of the law by flight or concealment; bail which is per se unreasonably great and clearly disproportionate to the offense involved, or shown to be so by the special circumstances of the particular case. In re Losasso, 15 Colo. 163, 24 P. 1080, 10 L.R.A. 847; Ex parte Ryan, 44 Cal. 558.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 4^th Edition

According to I.C.R. 46 (c), there are 10 factors that should be considered regarding when a defendant should be released on the defendant's own recognizance or admitted to bail, and the determination of the amount and conditions of bail. Most of the factors, including the fact that Jeannie has no prior criminal record, her character and reputation, the nature of the current charge (although to me any charge is severe), her strong family, our ties to this community via our property and current court case, and the fact she did not attempt to flee or resist arrest, among other issues, would have been in favor of her release on her own recognizance.

 

10. Jeannie Smith was not read her Miranda Rights.

After Jeannie was arrested, the officer who appeared to be the lead officer repeatedly came over and questioned her. At no time did he or any other officer read her rights to her or advise her she had the right to remain silent, that any statement she made may be used as evidence against her, or that she had the right to the presence of an attorney.

 

Miranda Rule
Prior to any custodial interrogation; that is, questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way, the person must be warned:

1. That he has a right to remain silent;

2. That any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him;

3. That he has a right to the presence of an attorney;

4. That if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Unless and until these warnings or a waiver of these rights are demonstrated at the trial, no evidence obtained in the interrogation may be used against the accused. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 478, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 294. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4^th Edition (emphasis added)

 

“Despite the importance of cross-examination, we have concluded that the Miranda decision compels rejection of the State's position. The warnings mandated by that case, as a prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights, see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433,

443-444 (1974), require that a person taken into custody be advised immediately that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, and that he has a right to retained or appointed counsel before submitting to interrogation. Silence in the wake of

these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights…”
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 US 610 - Supreme Court 1976

At no time while Jeannie was in custody was she informed of any of these rights. However, she still chose to exercise her constitutional and legal right to remain silent when questioned by the officers. Incidentally, she also chose to exercise her right to remain silent when the officer who transported her to the jail made a call on his cell phone without a hands-free device while driving and broke the clearly posted speed limit in a non-emergency situation. In addition to the fact Jeannie was not informed of her rights, now the state wishes to criminally charge her for exercising these rights. Jeannie has been charged with violating I.C. § 18-705 for not answering the officers questions. However, this is not within the meaning of this code.

 

I.C. § 18-705. Resisting and Obstructing Officers.
Every person who willfully resists, delays or obstructs any public officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office or who knowingly gives a false report to any peace officer, when no other punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), and imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one (1) year.
(emphasis added)

 

Willful

Intending the result which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional; not accidental or involuntary.

A "willful" act may be described as one done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly, or inadvertently. Lobdell Car Wheel Co. v. Subielski, 125 A. 462, 464, 2 W.W.Harr. (Del.) 462.…willfulness…comprises acts of aggressive wrong, Stauffer v. Schlegel, 74 Ind.App. 431, 129 N.E. 44, 46; and presupposes a conscious purpose to injure…Premeditated; malicious; done with evil intent, or with a bad motive or purpose, or with indifference to the natural consequences; unlawful; without legal justification. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4^th Edition (emphasis added)

Obstructing an Officer

Implies forcible resistance; State v. Le Blanc, 115 Me. 142, 98 A. 119, 120; contra, State v. Estes, 185 N.C. 752, 117 S.E. 581, 582.

To "obstruct" a public officer means to oppose that officer. It does not mean to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed, or to defeat its execution, but that the officer himself shall be obstructed. Knoff v. State, 18 Okl.Cr. 36, 192 P. 596, 597; Ratcliff v. State, 12 Okl.Cr. 448, 158 P. 293, 294. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4^th Edition

 

Jeannie did not intend to delay any officer in the discharge of their duty. She was only exercising her constitutional, legal right to remain silent when officers, dressed in camo, and carrying black assault rifles, forcefully broke and entered “her house,” double handcuffed her, violated her constitutional rights, took her out into the cold rain, and processed her in the county jail, without any warrant, writ, probable cause, or other legal justification for their actions. A right that no officer instructed her of, but one she had nonetheless. Furthermore, Jeannie in no way obstructed or resisted any officer and complied with every lawful order they gave. You cannot obstruct justice when there is not a crime. Additionally, it is my understanding she is not lawfully required to provide her social security number as it is a violation of federal law to use a social security number for identification. However, even if she was required to give it, I can find no law that requires her to have it memorized. At the time she was asked for her social security number, she had no access to any of her personal information as everything but the clothes she was wearing had been seized and confiscated by the officers she was allegedly obstructing.

 

11. Jeannie Smith was illegally and falsely arrested before she allegedly committed a public offence.

I.C. § 19-603. When Peace Officer May Arrest.
A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.

In direct violation of Jeannie’s constitutional right to “be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,” sheriff deputies and state police broke and entered, and arrested her without a warrant or search warrant before she allegedly committed the offence. Idaho code gives law enforcement the authority to arrest someone without a warrant when a public offence is committed in their presence. Our property was invaded sometime after 9 a.m. on November 12, 2019, at which time Jeannie’s window was broken and she was immediately arrested. According to the Uniform Citation Jeannie was given the night of November 12, 2019, she did not allegedly commit any offence until 1427 hours, or 2:27 p.m. Even if she had actually committed the crimes for which she is charged, she was illegally arrested and detained, without a warrant, and subjected to inhumane treatment, long before she had allegedly committed any crime, in violation of I.C. § 18-703, I.C. § 18-704, I.C. § 19-602 and I.C. § 19-603. Idaho code does not grant law enforcement the authority to break into someone’s home and arrest them in anticipation of an alleged offence. Witnesses to the events of November 12, 2019, stated they had not even seen such an unwarranted display of force used in a big city drug bust situation. The officers had no authority to arrest Jeannie without a warrant and without probable cause, until and unless she had allegedly committed a public offence in their presence.

 

12. Jeannie Smith was not notified March 10, 2020, would be anything more than a pre-trial conference.

On January 29, 2020, I was present at a pre-trial conference for Jeannie which was then continued. At this hearing the Court mentioned that the state wished to amend their complaint, but stated it was not going to address this issue. The Court gave no indication if or when this issue would be dealt with. Jeannie was then given a notice for a pre-trial conference scheduled on March 10, 2020. Jeannie never received any other notice from the Court or the prosecuting attorney, or any other indication the Court would address this issue on March 10, 2020.

Jeannie’s rights were violated because she had no notice or warning this issue would be addressed. She had no opportunity to try to research legal arguments for/against amending a criminal complaint, attempt to review the appropriate rules, try to obtain legal counsel or representation for this new development, or any other action to protect herself. Jeannie was thrust into defending herself, pro se, with no preparation or advice. She was only prepared to argue for a continuance for her pre-trial conference, but was not prepared and had no way to be prepared to argue additional issues. Furthermore, as she informed the Court, she has never seen the amended complaint.

 

13. The state violated I.C.R. 10(d)(2) by failing to give Jeannie Smith notice of the arraignment.

According to I.C.R. 10(d)(2) the state was required to give Jeannie at least three days’ notice prior to the arraignment. Jeannie never received any notice by the state that she would be arraigned on an additional and greater charge on March 10, 2020.

 

Idaho Criminal Rule 10. Arraignment on Indictment or Information

(2)  If the defendant is at liberty on defendant's own recognizance or on bail pursuant to a court order issued in the same criminal action, the prosecuting attorney must, on at least three days' notice to the defendant and to defendant's attorney, notify the defendant and defendant's attorney that an information or indictment has been filed against the defendant and the time and place set for arraignment. Notice must be given to the defendant either in person or by mail at the defendant's last known address. (emphasis added)

 

14. The state violated I.C.R. 10(a) by attempting to arraign Jeannie Smith 71 days after the information was filed.
According to the Case Summary, she obtained from the Court Clerk on March 10, 2020, the state filed their amended complaint on December 30, 2019. Per I.C.R. 10(a), the defendant must be arraigned within 30 days after filing information.

 

Idaho Criminal Rule 10. Arraignment on Indictment or Information

(a)  In General. After an indictment or an information has been filed with the district court, the defendant must be arraigned on it by the court. The defendant must appear in person at the arraignment. The arraignment must be within 30 days after the filing of an information. (emphasis added)

 

The state has violated the Idaho Criminal Rules by attempting to arraign Jeannie over 40 days later than allowed by Rule 10(a).

 

15. The state violated I.C.R. 10(c) by allegedly arraigning Jeannie Smith when she had not pled the additional charge.

After the Court granted the state leave to amend their complaint, although Jeannie communicated she had not seen the complaint, wished to obtain counsel, and objected to the state amending their complaint, the Court stated that it had arraigned Jeannie on the additional charge of obstructing justice. However, the Court never asked Jeannie to plead on this charge in violation of I.C.R. 10(c).

 

Idaho Criminal Rule 10. Arraignment on Indictment or Information
(c)  Arraignment. Arraignment must be conducted in open court and consist of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or stating to the defendant the substance of the charge and requiring the defendant to plead to it. The defendant may waive the reading of the indictment or information. The defendant must be given a copy of the indictment or information before the defendant is required to plead. The defendant must be informed that if the name that appears on the indictment or information is not defendant's true name, the defendant must then state defendant's true name or be proceeded against by the name in the indictment or information. If, on the arraignment, the defendant requires time to enter a plea, the defendant must be allowed a reasonable time, not less than one day, in which to answer the indictment or information. (emphasis added)

In addition, if the Court somehow interpreted Jeannie’s silence as a refusal to plea, although the Court never asked her for a plea, she was not given a copy of the complaint during the arraignment, nor was she informed she was allowed additional time to enter a plea as provided in I.C.R. 10(c).

16. The state violated I.C.R. 10(b) by proceeding with the arraignment after Jeannie Smith communicated she wished to attempt to obtain counsel before proceeding with the additional different and greater charge.

Although Jeannie has proceeded on the state’s first charge without counsel up to this point, she has had no opportunity to obtain counsel for this additional and greater charge. According to I.C.R. 10(b) the additional proceedings on March 10, 2020, should not have taken place until Jeannie had time to obtain counsel. At no time has she waived her right to counsel, and she has repeatedly communicated to the Court her desire to attempt to secure counsel despite the extenuating circumstances which have prevented it so far.

 

Idaho Criminal Rule 10. Arraignment on Indictment or Information

(b)  Right to Counsel. If the defendant appears for arraignment without counsel, before being arraigned, the defendant must be informed by the court that defendant has the right to have counsel either of defendant's own selection, or if indigent, by court appointment…No proceedings may take place before the appointment of counsel or until the defendant has had a reasonable period of time to obtain counsel unless the defendant waives the right to counsel. (emphasis added)

 

17. The state has prejudiced Jeannie Smith’s substantial rights by amending their complaint to include a different and greater offense.

 

Idaho Criminal Rule 3. Citable Offenses - Methods of Initiating Prosecution - Trial - Consolidation.
(d) …The court may amend or permit to be amended any process or pleading at any time before the prosecution rests including the alleging of a lesser included offense, but no greater or different offense may be charged if substantial rights of the defendant are prejudiced. (emphasis added)

 

A. The state seeks to add this different and greater offence without probable cause.
The state wishes to charge Jeannie with a violation of I.C. § 18-705. Resisting and Obstructing Officers. The definition of obstructing an officer specifies a physical obstruction.

 

Obstructing an Officer

Implies forcible resistance; State v. Le Blanc, 115 Me. 142, 98 A. 119, 120; contra, State v. Estes, 185 N.C. 752, 117 S.E. 581, 582.

To "obstruct" a public officer means to oppose that officer. It does not mean to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed, or to defeat its execution, but that the officer himself shall be obstructed. Knoff v. State, 18 Okl.Cr. 36, 192 P. 596, 597; Ratcliff v. State, 12 Okl.Cr. 448, 158 P. 293, 294. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition

 

According to the Case Summary Jeannie was given on March 10, 2020, only one Probable Cause Affidavit has been filed. This affidavit does not state or imply that Jeannie ever obstructed an officer. Furthermore, this affidavit never states any order given by an officer that Jeannie did not obey. Per the Case Summary, no additional affidavits, reports or any other additional information has been filed since this time. There is nothing in the record that supports this charge.

 

Probable Cause.

Reasonable cause. State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545, 198 N.W. 282, 284. Having more evidence for than against. Ex parte Souza, 65 Cal.App. 9, 222 P. 869, 870. A reasonable ground for belief in the existence of 'facts warranting the proceedings complained of. Owens v. Graetzel, 149 Md. 689, 132 A. 265, 267. An apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry, (that is, such inquiry as the given case renders convenient and proper,) which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe, in a criminal case, that the accused person had committed the crime charged…   Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition

The finding of probable cause must be based on substantial evidence that there is a factual basis for the information furnished. I.C.R. 5

The state attempting to add this greater offence, especially without any evidence, probable cause, affidavit, sworn testimony or any other justifying reason is vexatious, a malicious accusation, a violation of Jeannie’s constitutional rights and an extreme miscarriage of the justice they purport to uphold.

B. The state is violating Jeannie’s constitutional rights in alleging this different and greater offence.

Although the state seeks to accuse Jeannie of obstructing and/or delaying an officer and refusing to comply with their orders, the state did not inform Jeannie of the essence (how she physically obstructed an officer and which orders she allegedly refused to comply with) or the grounds for legal action (Jeannie peacefully submitted to arrest, double handcuffing, being placed in inhumane conditions, searching of her person, transportation, and imprisonment.).

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation… (emphasis added) Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States

The state has fatally failed to inform Jeannie K. Smith or this Court of the nature and cause of the accusations against her.

 

CONCLUSION

Therefore, in the interest of justice, fairness, and the protection of Jeannie K. Smith’s constitutional rights, I am writing this letter to ask this court to dismiss all charges against Jeannie. On November 12, 2019, Jeannie was going about her day, doing routine maintenance/land improvements to the property, while enjoying her well established right to use the property in question with the express and implied permission of any and all disclosed potential owners. Her motives and purpose of being on the property on November 12, 2019, were not to harm or destroy the property in any way, but rather to exercise her liberty of enjoying the property and use her time, effort and resources to add to and preserve the value and beauty  of the property. The Sheriff of Clearwater County had informed us in Jeannie’s presence that all eviction actions against this property had been stopped. Chris Goetz had personally given us his personal and professional word in Jeannie’s presence that should the intentions, directions, or actions of the bank change in any way, he would inform us. Without warning, service of any writs or warrants, probable cause, or legal right, sheriff deputies and state police dressed in tactical gear and armed with assault rifles, trespassed our property, cut down locked gates, broke windows, axed down doors, tracked mud all through white carpet, shattered and left home canned goods on the floor, terrorized and injured our animals, and confiscated and seized our belongings. Jeannie’s constitutional rights to be secure in her person, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures were violated. She was never served or shown a writ or warrant. She was not informed of any intention to arrest her, the cause of her arrest, or any authority to arrest her, prior to being arrested. She was falsely arrested before she even allegedly committed a crime. Although she did not resist in any way or attempt to flee, she was double handcuffed, made to sit out in the cold and rain for hours, never advised of her rights, and forced to post excessive bail. She did not obstruct any officer and complied with every lawful order they gave. She did not, nor was she capable of committing the crimes for which she was accused per I.C. § 18-114, I.C. § 18-201, I.C. § 18-705, I.C. § 18-7008(2)(a), I.C. § 18-7008(6)(a)(i), and the legal definitions of these terms. However, the Clearwater County Sheriff’s Office, the Clearwater County Prosecutor’s Office, the Idaho State Police and this Court have violated, at a minimum, I.C. § 18-703; I.C. § 18-704; I.C. § 18-2901; I.C. § 19-602; I.C. § 19-603; I.C. § 19-608;  I.C.R. 5(b); I.C.R. 10(a); I.C.R. 10(b); I.C.R. 10(c); I.C.R. 10(d)(2); fourth and eighth amendments of the Constitution of the United States; Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article I, Section 6 and 17; the Miranda Rule; and the Idaho Civil Sheriffs Manual, 1.3.9..

Therefore, in the interest of justice and adherence to the law, I urge this court as a friend of law and justice to dismiss all charges against Jeannie K. Smith. If the Court chooses not to dismiss the charges, Jeannie has expressed to me and many others her desire for this Court to disqualify the Clearwater County Prosecutor’s Office due to their exhibited prejudice and the blatant violations of the law as demonstrated in part above. She has also requested I be allowed to help her navigate these proceedings, until she can secure licensed counsel she believes can and will protect her interests.

In the interest of justice, fairness and preservation of the law,

Nick Nickerson

cc:
Jeannie K. Smith
E. Clayne Tyler